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NOTE
THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST LAW IN RAILROAD
MERGERS-A CASE STUDY: THE GREAT
NORTHERN AND NORTHERN PACIFIC
MERGER
The railroad industry is so highly regulated that practically
any action it takes or attempts to take is subject to Interstate
Commerce Commission approval.' Among the many regulations,
perhaps the most important is the control over competition. There
are two basic areas of control over railroad competition handled by
the Commission: ratemaking2 and required approval of all merger
and control proceedings. This Note will deal exclusively with the
latter of these two controls.
It was established early that the Sherman Antitrust Act3 and
section 7 of the Clayton Act 4 were applicable to railroads.5  In
1920, Congress reversed the national policy concerning railroad con-
solidation by authorizing exemptions from the antitrust laws to
mergers that were in the public interest; 6 this exemption is still
applicable today. The exemption did little if anything to clarify
the Commission's position. The question immediately arose as to
whether or not any unification that substantially lessened competition
was in the public interest. The Justice Department has continually
challenged mergers on antitrust grounds, and the Commission de-
ciding each merger on a case to case basis appears uncertain as
to just what part competition should play. In recent years, the
Commission has realized that the railroads are no longer in a position
to infracture the antitrust laws by substantially lessening competition.
This change of thought has met with opposition from both the Justice
1. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, §§ 301-328 (1958) ; Parts I and II of the Interstate Commerce
Act.
2. Rate-making has had a long struggle with the antitrust laws extending as far
back as United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958); Section 1 states "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, In restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is declared to 5e illegal."'
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958) provides that, "No corporation en-
gaged In commerce shall acquire directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another cor-
poration engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition my be substantially to lessen competition or to
tend to create a monopoly." This is the section as amended by Celler-Kefauver Act (1958).
5. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) ; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n. 166
U.S. 290 (1897).
6. Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat 456 (1920).
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Department and the newly formed President's Interagency Com-
mittee.'
This Note will make a complete review of the problems involved,
pointing out the significant periods of railroad legislation, the
changes that have taken place in the competitive position of the
railroad industry and will attempt to establish as a general propo-
sition that antitrust law should not apply to railroads. The proposed
merger between the Great Northern Railway, Northern Pacific,
Chicago Burlington & Quincy and Spokane Portland & Seattle serves
as an excellent case study. Though this merger is not typical, it
is suitable for study because it contains several of the elements
that have heretofore curbed mergers.
RAILWAY LEGISLATION AND THE PROBLEM
Prior to the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in 1887, the government did not affirmatively exercise the
right to regulate rail commerce between the states, rather such
regulation was left to the individual states." The power of the
states, however, was inadequate for broad regulation and in the
absence of the exercise of federal jurisdiction the railroads policed
themselves.9 It was in this period of loose regulation that the first
flood of mergers took place bringing together local lines in an effort
to provide direct routes between the major traffic centers. The
most active period in this regulation free paradise was between
1889-1890 when one-sixth of the total rail mileage was absorbed. 10
The Sherman Act of 189011 did not include an exemption for
railroads, but since the Interstate Commerce Act, passed in 1887,12
did not have any provisions for the control of consolidation, it was
apparent that Congress intended to subject railroads to antitrust
law. In striking down an attempt to consolidate the Great Northern
and Northern Pacific under a holding company in 1904, the Supreme
Court decided the landmark case of Northern Securities v. United
States 8 which put to rest any doubt about whether or not the
antitrust laws should apply to consolidations. The court held that
the two lines were parallel and competing, therefore violated anti-
trust law.
Virtually every proposed merger from the Northern Securities
7. President Kennedy, in his transportation message to Congress on April 5, 1962
announced the formation of an interagency committee consisting of representatives of
the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Labor and the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers. 108 CONG. REC. 5987 (1962).
8. Harris, Symposium of the Interstate Commerce: Introduction, 31 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1, 4 (1962).
9. Ibid.
10. Statitics of Railways in the United States 19 (1899).
11. Supra note 3.
12. 24 Stat 379 (1887).
18. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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case until the Transportation Act of 1920 was struck down on the
grounds that it was in violation of antitrust law. The reason for
the strict interpretation of the antitrust laws subsequent to the
Northern Securities case has never been fully explained. One author
has reasoned that the carriers received a governmental grant of
monopoly in a franchise and they should be barred from any action
that would extend the monopoly. 14 In the latter part of the 19th
century, there was a vigorous anti-monopoly movement composed
largely of farmers and laborers who wanted dissolution of all trusts.15
Since the railroads were near these small pressure groups, they
were the most logical target for this politically favored discipline
demanding strict antitrust policy.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act passed in 1914,16 which prohibited
a corporation engaged in commerce from acquiring the stock of
another corporation when such acquisition would substantially lessen
competition between them, was applicable to railroads and brought
to a halt any type of railroad consolidation.
The Transportation Act of 1920 passed in an effort to cure post-
war weekness resulted in two significant changes in railroad consoli-
dation. First, section 5 (4) required the Commission to draw up a
plan for consolidating the railroads of the United States and in the
plan it was required to take into account the following factors:
(a) the preservation of competition; (b) the effect the consilidation
would have on existing routes and channels of trade; (c) the con-
solidation should be arranged in such a manner that the companies
would receive substantially the same rate of return on their invest-
ment. Second, section 5 (8) provided for the exemption of carriers
from state and federal antitrust laws when necessary to effect any
combination authorized by the Commission. In the twenty years
after the act several plans were introduced by the Commission,"
but none solved the problems. In 1929, the Commission advanced
a solution whereby twenty-one regional systems would be formed.18
This plan was a dismal failure because of the financial crisis of the
thirties and the realignment of railroad ownership and control not
conforming to the master plan. 19
In an effort to cure some of the ills of the 1920 act Congress
passed the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933.20 This
14. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CH. L. REv. 153, 157 (1947).
15. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS L. Rev. 741, 747 (1963).
16. Supra note 4.
17. Consolidation of Railroads, 63 I.C.C. 455 (1921).
18. Matter of the Consolidation -of the Railway Properties of the United States Into
a Limited Number of Systems, 159 I.C.C. 522 (1929).
19. Liipfert, Consolidation and Competition in Transportation: The Need for an
Effective and Consistent-Policy, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 106, 114 (1962); Although there
was considerable shifting in the industry, it is Interesting to note that for the period
1929 to 1940 there was only one merger recorded and that was of the "failing business"
variety. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R. Merger, 236 I.C.C. 61 (1939).
20. 48 Stat. 211 (1933).
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act placed the control of all consolidations under a single set of
standards and required the Commission to consider the promotion
of public interest when approving mergers. Despite this additional
legislation, the financial crisis of the day prevented any active
consolidation.
Up to this time the transportation problems of the nation were
largely restricted to the railroads, but with the development of the
intercity highway systems in the late 1920's and 1930's the competitive
motor carrier was introduced. The inland water carriers, also,
gained competitively during this period when government sponsor-
ship and encouragement instigated a program of improved water-
ways. 21  With these new developments, intermodel competitors
became a factor as well as intramodel competition when considering
a proposed merger.
The Transportation Act of 194022 was passed after it became
obvious that the nationalized system promulgated by the Commission
was not feasible and that the transportation picture of the nation
had changed. This legislation was devoted to mergers that were
strictly carrier initiated and abandoned the forced consolidation
technique of prior plans. The consolidation laws for both railroads
and motor carriers were combined into one section and the rules
governing mergers were set out in more detail. The Commission
was authorized to allow mergers if they were in the public interest
by giving weight to the following factors: (1) the effect of the
proposed transition on adequate transportation service to the public;
(2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion of, or failure
to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed
transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed
transaction; (4) the effect on the interest of the carrier's employees. 23
The exemption from antitrust prosecution afforded in the 1920 act
was continued in the Transportation Act of 1940.24 This exemption
was relatively untried up to 1940 due to the unfavorable atmosphere
that had hovered over the industry for the past two decades. It had
been decided early that there was a combination illegal under the
Sherman Act that could be approved by the Commission as
"consistent with the public interest, ' 25 but there was no determin-
ation as to what created such a situation or to what extent the
Commission would go to shut out the antitrust laws. The more
favorable economic conditions and the new act sparked interest
21. Liipfert, supra note 19. at 115.
22. 54 Stat. 898 (1940) 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
23. 54 Stat. 906 (1940) 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(c) (1958).
24. 54 Stat. 905 (1940) 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958), "Any carrier . . . [is] relieved
from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints . . . insofar as may
be necessary to enable [it] to carry into effect the transaction so approved . . . by the
Commission."
25. Control of Central Pacific Ry. by Southern Pacific, 76 I.C.C. 508 (1923).
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in mergers and it became apparent that the extent of the Com-
mission's power would be questioned.
The case of McLean Trucking v. United States2 6 is the first
case to deal directly with the antitrust law exemption. In this case
the Supreme Court held that the Commission was not bound to a
vigorous application of the antitrust laws in merger cases for this
would render the exemption meaningless. The court reasoned that
it was for the Commission in each case to give "strict regard" to
the impact of the antitrust laws and then strike an appropriate
balance between competition and the "public interest. ' ' 27 Justice
Douglas' dissent in this case challenged the weight accorded com-
petitive factors by the Commission, arguing that "exercise of the
administrative authority to grant exemptions from the antitrust laws
should be closely confined to those occasions where the transportation
need is clear. ' 28 Justice Douglas contended that the "public
interest" must include the principles of free enterprise because
they are basic in our economy 29 and that Congress could hardly
have intended these principles "to be swept aside unless t h e y
were in fact obstacles to the realization of the national transportation
policy."2 0 This is the view adopted in the Attorney General's report
on Antitrust Law:
All other factors being equal, the policy of the antitrust
laws would clearly favor competition by two to service by
one. If, therefore, the statutory standard of 'public interest'
gives any effect at all to antitrust policy, in a case in which
all other factors neutralize one another, it should require a
regulatory agency to resolve such an issue in favor of
competition rather than monopoly.3
In a recent case, the Supreme Court substantiated the McLean
decision by holding that the Commission had authority to abridge
the antitrust laws, and inconsistency in its own right would not
necessarily invalidate the Commission's approval. 2 The Court did
not give the Commission a free hand, but rather attempted to limit
its authority by requiring a balancing of the curtailment of com-
petition, with the advantages afforded the carrier and the public
to determine whether or not a proposed consolidation would assist
in effectuating the overall transportation policy.
Although the Supreme Court may have indicated a willingness
to support the Commission on any merger that is reasonable
26. 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
27. Id. at 86.
28. Supra note 26, at 93.
29. Bupra note 26, at 94.
30. Id.
31. ATTY GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 267 (1955).92. Minneapolis & St Louis Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959); Compare
Toledo P. & W. R.R., 295 I.C.C. 523 (1957).
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considering public interest,33 its "balancing test" has placed the
role of competition and antitrust in a state of uncertainty and
confusion. The Commission, in its traditional manner, 34 has approved
mergers in which competition was not a factor.3 5 But when a
merger between two parallel roads would reduce intramodel com-
petition it has had a tendancy to refuse the application.36 The
Justice Department, on the other hand, when opposing a proposed
merger asserts that the merger would "flagrantly contravene" the
antitrust laws because it would "destroy the vigorous competition"
existing between the two roads. The Department argues that the
courts have held that the I.C.C. cannot ignore the antitrust laws
in deciding a merger case if the effect of the merger would lessen
competition substantially.3 7 Thus, the present status of competition
in railway mergers is unknown. The Commission is still handling
mergers on a case to case basis and a clash with the Justice
Department appears almost certain.
Today mergers are taking place under different pressures and
conditions than existed in the past.3 8 Monopoly was one of the few
issues raised in the pioneer mergers; today, labor and service to
the public account for major issues.39  Monopolistic claims are
obsolete, a relic of the past when rails served local needs and
lacked rivals.40  A merger no longer lessens competition, rather
it makes competition in that it enables the railroads to better serve
the public. More definite guide lines should be set up for the
Commission so the railroads will be able to forecast the outcome
of a proposed merger. 41  The "public interest" yardstick does not
33. The 1940 Act subsituted the phrase "be consistent with" for "promote" with re-
gard to public interest. It has been suggested that the new phrase "be consistent with"
the public interest does not connote a public interest to be deprived or suggest the idea
of promotion of public interest. The thought conveyed is merely one of compatibility.
Pacific Power & Light v. Federal Power Comm., 111 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1940).
34. See generally Huntington, The Marasmus of the I.C.C.: The Commission, the Rail-
road and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 472-74 (1952). This article indicates
that the Commission and the railroad industry have been traditionally dependent upon
each other and as a result the former will give the railroads favorable consideration if
it is within the Commission's power. It is also mentioned that this harmony has been
lessened somewhat with the reduced standing and influence of the railroad industry.
35. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 312 I.C.C. 285 (1960) ; Duluth So. S. & Alt. R.R., 312 I.C.C.
341 (1960); The Commission apparently confused on the meaning of competition, has in
the past taken the view that if two railroads run parallel they are competitive. This
fallacy, stemming from the days of the railway monopoly, has to some extent been
overcome in recent decisions, which is indeed encouraging. They have, also, shown a
willingness to weigh heavily the economics of a merger against the lessening of com-
petition.
36. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 271 I.C.C. 5 (1948). See generally Connant, RAILROAD CON-
SOLIDATION AND THE ANTITRUST LAws, 14 STAN. L. REV. 489, 509-16 for a complete dis-
cussion of the merger situation and an analysis of many of the recent decisions.
37. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 1, 1961, p. 4, col. 3; See Wall Street Journal, March
27, 1964, p. 2, col. 1 for a more recent development in Justice Department challenge.
38. Louisville & N. R.R., 295 I.C.C. 457, 468 (1957).
39. The union groups in order to raise public support in their behalf have devised
various methods of approach. The Northern Pacific employees have received their pay
in silver dollars to show the effect their wages have on the economy of Billings, Montana.
In Jamestown, North Dakota, a similar scheme was devised only payment was made in
two dollar bills. Checks printed with the slogan "these are railway dollars" have, also,
been used. Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1962, p. 1, col. 6.
40. Burck, A Plan to Save the Railroads, Fortune, Aug. 1958, p. 83; President Ken-
nedy's Message on Transportation System of the United States, 108 CONe. Rac. 5986
(1962).
41. "This administration has a responsibility to recommend more specific guidelines
than those now available and more specific procedures for applying them." President
Kennedy's Message, supra note 40, at 5987.
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provide an adequate standard.4 2 The Sherman and Clayton Acts
should not be used as guide lines since if they do serve a purpose
in modern industry, though this is doubted by some authorities, 8
they do not in the railroad industry.
A CASE STUDY OF THE GREAT NORTHERN-NORTHERN PACIFIC
PROPOSED MERGER
The problems of a merger are so complex and different, it is
virtually impossible to find a typical case, but the merger of Great
Northern, Northern Pacific, Chicago Burlington & Quincy, and
Spokane Portland & Seattle is most suitable for this analysis because
it involves the following factors:
(1) This proposed combination is the only railroad system
that sets up a natural time table for mergers:
a. First merger attempt was before the establishment
of antitrust law.
b. Second merger proposal resulted in a landmark case
establishing the principle that antitrust laws were
applicable and controlled railway mergers.
c. Third attempt was made in 1930; a significant period
for railway merger and antitrust law.
d. Present merger proposal came in the midst of a
consolidation movement when application of anti-
trust principles is uncertain.
(2) The two major roads, Great Northern and Northern Pacific,
are parallel; this fact has been the number one hindrance of consoli-
dation until recently.
(3) The two major roads dominate a specific geographic area.
(4) All of the railroads involved are of the "healthy" variety.
(5) After consolidation, this railroad will be the largest in the
nation. Considering the above factors, if antitrust laws are held
to be inapplicable in this merger they would not apply in future cases.
During the development of the Northern Pacific, mortgage bonds
were issued, the majority of which were bought by the Great Northern.
The Northern Pacific later became insolvent and was forced into
the hands of receivers. A bond issue to facilitate reorganization
was guaranteed by the Great Northern in return for control of the
Northern Pacific. An individual bondholder brought an action to
enjoin the taking control of the Northern Pacific by the Great
Northern. This action was commenced under a Minnesota statute
42. This argument was rejected in New York Cent. See., 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932).
43. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS I Rzv. 741, 755 (1963).
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enacted in 1874 which prohibited a railroad from purchasing, leasing,
or controlling the franchise of another railway owning or having
control of a parallel or competing line. 4 The United States Supreme
Court held that the state law did apply to the railroads and that
such an acquisition was in violation of the antitrust act and could
not be allowed.4 5 Hence, the first attempt to operate the two northern
lines as a single unit failed.
Early in 1901 the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific
jointly acquired control of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. 4" In
November of 1901, the Northern Securities Company was formed.
This holding company obtained control of the Great Northern,
Northern Pacific, and also gained control of the Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy as a result of a stock exchange agreement with the
stockholders of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific. 47 In 1904,
the United States Supreme Court held this holding company arrange-
ment invalid. 48 The Court held that competition had ceased to exist
between the two lines and one powerful corporation had resulted;
that this type of consolidation was a restraint of interstate commerce
and a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The company was
dissolved and the three roads once again functioned as single units.4 9
In 1930, another proposal was introduced in an effort to secure
approval of the merger under the Transportation Act of 1920. The
Great Northern, Northern Pacific, Burlington, and Spokane, Portland
& Seattle would be consolidated into one company entitled the Great
Northern Pacific Railway Company operating as a single unit. The
Interstate Commerce Commission decided that the control and oper-
ation of the Great Northern Railway, the Northern Pacific, and the
Spokane Portland & Seattle by the newly formed company would
be in the "public interest" and legal under the Transportation Act
of 1920.50 The Commission, struggling to comply with the statutory
mandate of Congress which provided that it should promulgate a
master plan for the voluntary establishment of a limited number
of railroad systems, excluded the Burlington from the proposal. 5 1
The two northern roads apparently felt that the Burlington was an
imperative part of the plan because the merger was never carried
out.
Although the involved lines have since carried on in a co-operative
manner, there was no further "merger talk" between them until
44. GEN. LAWS or MINN. ch. 29 (1874).
45. Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896).
46. The First Ninety Years, Historical Sketch of the Burlington Railroad 13 (1941).
47. Tucker and O'Brien, The Public Interest in Railroad Mergers, 42 B.U.L. REV. 160,
164 (1962).
48. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
49. It is interesting to note that the assets of the Northern Securities Company, which
consisted of Great Northern and Northern Pacific shares, were distributed to the stock-
holders of the holding company when the company was dissolved. The same stockholders,
therefore, controlled both roads.
50. Great Northern Pacific R.R. Acquisition, 162 I.C.C. 37 (1930).
61. Ibid.
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1955 when the present proposal was presented. The engineering
consulting firm of Wyer, Dick and Company was employed to deter-
mine if a proposed merger would be economically feasible and if
service could be improved by such action. In December 1957, the
Wyer report was submitted advocating a saving of 43 million dollars
yearly, through unification.5 2 The proposed merger was given a
favorable vote by the stockholders of each road and arrangements
were made to carry it out.
A new railroad, the Great Northern Pacific and Burlington Lines,
was incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware and an
agreement was executed whereby the stock of the new company
was to be exchanged for the old in the event the merger was
accomplished.5 3  Extensive hearings on the proposed merger were
held by the Interstate Commerce Commission early in 1963 and
there is speculation that the Commission will make a report at
anytime.5 4 The merger of these four roads will establish a railroad
of 24,728 track miles and give birth to the biggest railroad in the
United States. The Great Northern ranks thirteenth in size5" among
the railroads of the United States serving ten states in the north-
western area of the United States and two Canadian provinces. It
serves a predominantly agricultural area in northeastern Minnesota,
North Dakota, and Montana, a highly productive mining area in
northeastern Minnesota, and a revenue producing lumber area in
Oregon and Washington. The total operating revenue and revenue
ton miles has been above the Northwestern Region and Class I
Railway averages since 1949.57
The Northern Pacific Railway, which is the nineteenth largest
railway per operating revenue in the United States,5 8 serves eight
states and the province of Manitoba. The Northern Pacific, like
the Great Northern, has the majority of its branch lines in North
Dakota and Minnesota while its main line extends westerly from
St. Paul to the states of Washington and Oregon. The Burlington,
the largest system in the merger, ranks number eleven in the United
52. Brief of Applicants, p. 8, Great Northern Pac. & Burlington Lines, Inc. Merger,
Finance Docket No. 21478-80 (1963).
53. Id. at 93.
54. Since the writing of this Note the Interstate Commerce Commission's examiner
has issued his report recommending that the merger be allowed with some exceptions.
It is speculated that a final ruling of the Commission will be forthcoming in about a
year's time. Examiner's Proposed Report, Aug. 24, 1964, Finance Docket No. 21478.
55. The track miles of the participating carriers are as follows: Great Northern 8,288,
Northern Pacific 6,834, Burlington 8,670, and Spokane Portland & Seattle 936. Con-
solidation-Key to Transportation Progress (Feb. 6, 1961) [Booklet published by the
participating roads providing basic information on the merger. Reproduced in Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 802 (1962)].
56. Id. at 993.
57. MOODY, TRANSPORTATION MANuAL 225 (1963).
58. Supra note 55. Northern Pacific has around eleven million dollars In revenue that
is derived from over two million acres of land and it has various rights on four million
more.
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States. 9 Its principal main lines extend from Chicago northwesterly
to St. Paul-Minneapolis; from Chicago westerly to Omaha, Nebraska
and Denver; from Lincoln, Nebraska to Billings, Montana. The
Burlington, unlike the Northern Pacific and Great Northern, receives
a great deal of its traffic from interchange with other roads. The.
Spokane Portland and Seattle, a minor railroad of 600 miles, is not
of great importance in regard to the problems confronting
this merger, therefore, no purpose would be served by exploring
its physical and operational aspects.
All the carriers involved in the proposed merger are in good
financial condition. The Great Northern and Northern Pacific are
regarded as two of the strongest railroads in the country financially. 0
The abundant blessings of nature in the northern area they serve
has been the main reason for this financial strength. Agriculture,
forest and mining products are ideal for railroad handling in that
the revenue is high and the utility of handling is low. They do not
require a high class of equipment and many of them have a common
destination. The diversity among their lead products is another
factor that contributes to their financial strength since these products
are in no way intradependent and provide a balancing of traffic
movement. The earnings and dividends have been high and consis-
tent.6 1 The operating revenue and revenue ton miles of the Great
Northern from 1949 to the present show a pattern well above the
Northwestern Region and Class I Railroads . 2 The Northern Pacific
shows a similar pattern. Both roads, also, have a great deal of
non-operating revenue.6 3 The Burlington displays similar financial
success.
6 4
It should first be established what connection there is between the
"public interest" standard and competition or antitrust. Although
it is not presently mentioned by the Commission as a distinct factor,
competition is possibly the most important "public interest" consider-
ation in railroad mergers, especially from the long range point of
view.6 5 In this particular merger hundreds of witnesses were heard
in an effort to determine its effect on the public; the Commission
made no attempt to determine for themselves the actual effect.
The "public interest" guideline born in the Transportation Act of
1920 did notprovide any real standard for the Commission to follow.66
The public interest might be one thing today and another, in the
59. Supra note 55.
60. Standard and Poors, Industry Surveys R.R. 53 (1963).
61. MOODY, TRANSPORTATION 1637 (April 10, 1964).
62. Supra note 57.
63. Northern Pacific, Sixty Seventh Annual Report 19 (1963) ; Great Northern,
Seventy Fourth Annual Report 21 (1962).
64. Supra note 61, at 1749.
65. Railroad Consolidation, Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 104 (1928).
66. Id. at 69.
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light of different circumstances, tomorrow. The Supreme Court in
1932 held that the term was not a mere general reference to
public welfare in the absence of standards for its application, but
that it had a direct relationship to adequate service, economy and
efficiency of operation, and to the best use of the facilities." This
case, as well as additional standards set by the Transportation Act
of 1940, has served as a basic guide for determination of public
interest for the past three decades. With the increased concentration
of mergers since 1957, it has become increasingly apparent that the
public interest does not remain static. Public interest is subject to
such a wide interpretation and varies so much in each case that
it serves little or no purpose as a standard. The view has been
expressed that it would be difficult to conceive of a statute that
confers more authority and greater administrative discretion than
section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. 68 There has been an
effort to spell out what is meant by the public interest standard, 9
but it is apparent, if any progress is to be made in the field of
railroad mergers, a new standard must be adopted.
The public has, in the interest of efficiency, accepted the elimi-
nation of competition and the creation of monopoly among many of
our public utilities, but it has somehow held to the notion that
competition must be preserved as much as possible in railroad
transportation.7 0  There may have been a time before effective
regulation and before competition from other modes of transportation
became a factor when this action was justified, but it cannot be
justified since our transportation industry has made its revolutionary
postwar change. Congress has neither made the antitrust laws
wholly inapplicable to the railroad industry nor has it authorized the
Commission, when passing on proposed mergers, to ignore com-
petitive factors.7 1 In fact, the Commission has refused to approve
three recent mergers solely on the competitive grounds .72 A con-
sideration of the northern lines merger clearly indicates that the
concern with the lessening of competition in a merger case is a
fallacy.
The Great Northern, the Northern Pacific and the Burlington
67. New York Cent. See. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932).
68. Virginia Stage Lines v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 79, 82 (W.D. Va. 1942).
69. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., ser. 3093, pt. 2, at 809 (1962). This report
devotes 85 pages to analysing what is meant by "public interest," but it is obvious they
have done little more than confuse the issues. The late President Kennedy, expressing
his view on the "public interest" standard, stated: ". . . [T]he soundness of such mergers
should be determined not in the abstract, but by applying appropriate criteria to the
circumstances and conditions of each case .. " 108 CONG. REc. 5987 (1962) (President
Kennedy's message on Transportation Systems of the U.S.).
70. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 87th CoNG.
1ST SESS., REPORT ON NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 260 (1961) ; referred to as
Doyle's Report
71. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959) ; McLean
Trucking v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
72. Minneapolis St. P. & S. St. M. Ry. Acquisition, 295 I.C.C. 787 (1958); Spokane
Int'l R.R. Control, 295 I.C.C. 425 (1956) ; Chicago B. & Q. Control, 271 I.C.C. 63 (1948).
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each serve a geographic territory that is economically independent
of the territory served by the other. The Great Northern and the
Northern Pacific, irrespective of the fact that they are parallel, are
widely separated, especially in North Dakota and Montana. Because
of this position there will be very few so called monopolistic areas
afforded the new company. Ninty-six per cent of t h e stations
served by the applicants either will continue unchanged as to the
number of railroads served or will continue to be served by two
or more railroads.7 3 The stations served by only one railroad account
for over three per cent of the freight tonnage and most of them have
other transportation facilities. 74 This becomes all the more significant
in light of the fact that fifteen percent of all the cities in the United
States are served by only one railroad.7 5 Grand Forks, North Dakota,
one of the biggest cities stranded with one road, has highway,
pipeline and air competition.
The days are over when the extent of effective compe-
tition could be appraised by examining only the rail carriers. Today
all types of transportation must be taken into consideration.7 6 Since
the end of World War II, the railroads have been getting less traffic
each year while their competitors show a steady increase. The
proportion of the intercity traffic carried by the railroads has de-
creased from sixty-six per cent in 1946 to forty per cent in 1961. The
proportion carried by highway carriers in this same period has
risen from nine per cent to twenty-six per cent; the portion by
waterways increased from thirteen per cent to fifteen per cent; and
by pipelines from ten per cent to seventeen per cent.7 7 It should be
noted that private and exempt motor carriers give additional compe-
tition.7 In the thirteen state area served by the merging carriers,
total truck registrations in 1962 were 2.8 million, an increase of
almost one-fourth of the grain shipments to Minneapolis and Duluth. 9
The argument has been made that if the railroads are able to
compete as single units the merger will cause them to be predominate
and thereby become less competitive. The northern lines merger
is susceptible to this argument because as explained earlier, all
roads involved are strong financially and control the rail service in
the area. The Interestate Commerce Commission in the recent
case of Seaboard Line R.R. Merger-Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,80
reasoned that the intense competition in recent years from other
73. Supra note 52. at 62.
74. Supra note 52, at 66.
75. Louisville & Nashville R.R Merger, 295 I.C.C. 457, 482 (1957).
76. Norfolk & W. By. Merger, 307 I.C.C. 401, 417 (1959).
77. Interstate Commerce Comm., Bur. of Commerce & Stat., Statement No. 6103
Table 1 (1961).
78. Koontz, Completition Between Regulated and Unregulated Transport, 58 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 217, 220 (1956).
79. Supra note 52, at 70.
80. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Merger-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., Finance Dkt. No. 21215,
decided Dec. 2, 1963.
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modes of transportation has caused the preservation of intramodel
rail competition to lose much of its significance in the furtherance
of anti-monopoly policy. This is indeed a wise and significant
step for the Commission to take. The government's intense effort
to obtain a shorter and more efficient highway network has given
the trucking industry a decisive advantage over the railroads. Pipe-
line and air transportation has been given similar advantages.
The railroads, on the other hand, were built in the late 1800's to
serve the transportation needs of the nation at that time. As a result
they are unable to give the service demanded by modern business.
The only way they can establish a competitive position is to consoli-
date so that they will have shorter routes and obtain better utilization
of their equipment. The northern lines have indicated that their
proposal will shorten by eleven to thirteen hours the travel time
from Seattle to Minneapolis and will better facilitate car movement
by avoiding empty home movement in the rush seasons.81 Such
improved conditions will not allow unified carriers to be predomi-
nate, 2 rather they will be able to hold their own in advancing a
national transportation system.
The final competitive problem is to determine the status of
connecting lines. It is inherent in a consolidation or merger of
railroads that there will be some traffic diversion. The problem
in issue is the quantity. Three adjoining roads will be affected by
this proposed merger - the Soo Line, the Milwaukee Road, and the
Chicago and North Western. Although it has not been determined
exactly what the decrease in traffic will be, the change will not be
sufficient to jeopardize the position of these roads. In Detroit, T &
I. R. R. Control3 the Commission, as a solution to this diversion
problem, prescribed a set of conditions for the protection of connect-
ing carriers.8 4  These conditions known as "standard routing
conditions" have been used in most mergers since that decision.85
The Commission held in a recent ruling very similar to the northern
lines merger-large controlling lines connected by smaller lines-
that intramodel competition will be controlled by these conditions. 6
It should be noted that the President's Interagency Committee inter-
fered in this holding, even though in another recent merger, they
issued a statement that if the merger was approved small carriers
81. Supra note 55.
82. See United States v. E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), es-
tablishing that there Is no monopoly where there are ready alternatives a person may
turn to for his needs. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), applied
this criteria to merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
83. 275 I.C.C. 455, 492 (1950).
84. The prescribed conditions require that routes and gateways be left open-to other
carriers, that neutrality in handling and movement be maintained without discrimination
against non-participating carriers, that no attempt be made to force industry to route
over the unified lines, and that the commission retains the right to re-open the hearing
on any abuse.
85. See Pennsylvania R.R. Control-Lehigh Valley I-R., 317 I.C.C. 139 (1962).
86. Supra note 80.
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would be forced to seek immediate resolution of their problems by
merging with others on the basis of short range expediency rather
than long range benefit. Such hasty realignment would not be in
the public interest and the small roads might even be driven out of
existence.87 In light of the fact that there is no large traffic loss
and since unifying carriers have agreed to accept the "standard
conditions," there is no intramodel competitive problem presented
by the northern lines merger.
The foregoing discussion of the northern lines merger clearly
demonstrates that in rail merger cases, even if it involves railroads
that are dominate in an area, competition in fact is not substantially
lessened to an extent that would violate either the Clayton Act or
the Sherman Act. The fact that the merging roads may be of the
"healthy" variety is not a criterion for refusing a merger. Their
financial health may be attributed to other factors; competitively
they may be as "sick" as any other road.
CONCLUSION
This writer concludes that there was a period in which the
railroads were in a monopolistic position and restrictions on mergers
were necessary, but this is no longer the case. The exemption from
antitrust law was given to the railroads during a financial crisis.
The railroads were still in a monopolistic state and the fictitious
"public interest" standard was set up to keep the lessening of
competition at a minimum. Although the financial crisis still exists,
the monopolistic position does not, therefore, the "public interest"
standard no longer serves a useful purpose.
Proper merger standards should be set so that a company propos-
ing a merger will know just exactly what it is required to do in order
to secure approval of the Commission. The present position of the
railroad industry calls for a new policy which would remove railroad
mergers from the ambit of antitrust law.
NEIL MCEWEN
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